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only disregarded the court's limited role on appeal but rested its holding on
the mistaken conclusion that the Board's findings concerning Mitchell and
Patillo's supervisory status were inconsistent.99 While inconsistent Board findings regarding the supervisory authority of two individuals in the same case
might constitute a valid reason to overturn a Board determination, the Board's
findings in St. Mary's Home concerning whether Mitchell and Patillo were
supervisors were consistent and thus provided the Fourth Circuit with little
ground upon which to overturn the Board's holding.'
SETH CALVEN PRAGER

XI.
A.

PRISONERS' RIGHTS

Federal Habeas Corpus: Novelty of Constitutional Claim as
Satisfying the Cause Prong of the Cause and Prejudice Test

A writ of habeas corpus allows a prisoner to obtain immediate relief from
illegal deprivation of the prisoner's liberty by a state.' Section 2254 of Title
28 of the United States Code provides that state prisoners may petition federal
courts for habeas corpus relief as a means of compelling legal justification
for the prisoner's confinement.' A federal court will issue a writ of habeas
corpus when a prisoner demonstrates that the state adjudication did not protect the defendant's interests under either the Constitution or the laws of the
United States. 3 Historically, a defendant's failure to comply with a state's conCircuit's review of Board's findings and analysis of Mitchell's supervisory status in St. Mary's
Home); St. Mary's Home, 690 F.2d at 1072 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (majority "pays lip service to" but disregards court's limited role on appeal); see also
supra notes 34-.41 and accompanying text (discussing dissent's findings in St. Mary's Home).
99. See supranotes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's misinterpretation
of Board's findings regarding supervisory status of Mitchell and Patillo).
100. See id. The Res-Care court acknowledged as prior case law the St. Mary's Home court's
reversal of the Board's determination that Mitchell was not a supervisor on the ground that Mitchell exercised exactly the same authority as Patillo, whom the Board classified as a supervisor.
See NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1468 (7th Cir. 1983).
1. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976). Section 2241 of Title 28 of the United States Code authorizes
the Supreme Court, federal district courts, Supreme Court justices, and federal circuit judges
to grant writs of habeas corpus to prisoners whom the state government or federal government
illegally has incarcerated. Id. § 2241(a).
2. Id. § 2254. Section 2254 of Title 28 of the United States Code allows the Supreme
Court, federal district courts, Supreme Court justices, and federal circuit judges to consider petitions from state prisoners for federal habeas corpus review. Id. § 2254(a).
3. See id. § 2254(d)(7) (to obtain federal habeas corpus review petitioner must allege denial
of due process in state proceeding); id. § 2241(c)(3) (habeas corpus relief not available unless
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temporaneous objection rule barred federal habeas review.4 A contemporaneous
objection rule typically requires a defendant to object promptly to the introduction of evidence or the issuance of jury instructions at trial. 5 In the past thirty
years, however, the Warren Court promoted the judicial goal of fairness toward
defendants by expanding the availability of habeas corpus relief while the Burger

Court advanced
the ideal of finality of adjudication in restricting the availability
6
of the writ.
The Warren Court, believing that a forfeiture of a defendant's constitutional rights is intolerable, expanded the rights of criminal defendants.' Emphasizing that the courts must protect the constitutional rights of criminal

defendants, the Warren Court increased a state prisoner's chances of obtaining habeas corpus review in federal court.' In Fay v. Noia,9 the Warren Court
held that a state prisoner who has failed to comply with state procedural rules

requiring the exhaustion of state remedies nevertheless may file a petition for
federal habeas corpus review if the prisoner did not by-pass deliberately state
appellate remedies." ° The Warren Court formulated the "deliberate by-pass"
prisoner is in custody in violation of Constitution or laws of United States). To obtain federal
habeas corpus relief, a petitioner must show that he is in custody, that he is presenting a federal
question, that he has exhausted his state remedies, and that he has not waived his rights to habeas
corpus relief. See Johnson & Davenport, A FederalHabeas CorpusPrimer,4 Am.. J. TRIAL ADvoc.
51, 54 (1980). The Constitution of the United States inspired the enactment of the original habeas
corpus statute. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat.
73, 81-82 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976)). Federal courts have had the power
to issue writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners since 1867. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28,
§ 1, 14 Stat. 385, 386 (1867) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976)).
4. See Ex Parte Spencer, 228 U.S. 652, 660-61 (1913) (Court denied petitioner habeas
corpus review for failure to object to constitutionality of statute at trial).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 162 (1982) (defendant must object
to jury instructions before jury retires); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 115 & n.15 (1982) (same);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977) (requiring defendant to make motion to suppress
evidence prior to trial).
6. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARv. L. REv. 62, 217 & n.1 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as 1981 Term] (referring to differences in attitude between Warren Court and
Burger Court); infra text accompanying notes 7-34 (tracing history of judicial application of habeas
corpus relief).
7. See Hill, The Forfeitureof ConstitutionalRights in Criminal Cases, 78 CoLUm. L. Rv.
1050, 1096 (1978) (commenting on general goal of Warren Court).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 9-11 (discussing Warren Court's expansion of federal
habeas corpus through Fay decision); see also Michael, The "New" Federalism and the Burger
Court'sDeference to the States in FederalHabeasProceedings,64 IowA L. REv.233, 239 (1969)
(discussion of habeas corpus decisions of Warren Court); Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural
Default and the Burger Court, U. PA. L. REv. 473, 473 (1978) (same).
9. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
10. Id. at 438. In Fay v. Noia the defendant failed to appeal his murder conviction by
the County Court of Kings County, New York, and therefore could not petition for state collateral relief. Id. at 394-96. The defendant petitioned for federal habeas corpus review claiming
that his conviction resulted from the admission into evidence of a coerced confession. Id. at
396 & n.2. The Supreme Court in Fay held that a state procedural default does not limit a federal
court's power of review under the federal habeas corpus statute. Id. at 398-99, 438; see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(a) (1976); see also Spritzer, supra note 8, at 497-98 (discussion of Fay).
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test in Fay to protect a defendant's constitutional rights from forfeiture because
of inadvertence or negligence of the defendant's attorney."
In contrast to the Warren Court's expansion of habeas corpus rights, the
Burger Court established a trend of restricting the availability of federal habeas
corpus relief.' 2 More specifically, to promote the finality of judgments and
judicial efficiency, the Burger Court expected the state courts to protect the
constitutional rights of citizens.' 3 For example, in Wainwright v. Sykes,'4 the
Burger Court created a new, prohibitive standard to replace the Fay "deliberate
by-pass" test. 5 The Fay test created problems for courts that had to determine whether a prisoner had intended to by-pass state procedural remedies
by applying for a federal writ of habeas corpus.' 6 As a remedy for the problems the "deliberate by-pass" test created, the Sykes Court devised a twopart "cause and prejudice" test that allows prisoners to petition federal courts
for habeas corpus relief despite a state procedural bar to appellate review."
11. 372 U.S. 398-99. See Comment, "FundamentalMiscarriageof Justice". The Supreme
Court's Version of the "Truly Needy" in Section 2254 Habeas CorpusProceedings,20 SAN DIEGO
L. Rav. 371, 384 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Miscarriageof Justice] (court will deny habeas corpus review if defendant deliberately by-passed state procedural remedies for tactical reasons but
can grant review if defendant's by-pass of state remedies was through oversight).
12. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (court must dismiss habeas corpus petition
if petition contains unexhausted claim); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) (federal
habeas corpus review not available on Fourth Amendment claim when defendant had full and
fair opportunity to litigate in state court); see also 1981 Term, supra note 6, at 22 (contrasting
the Warren Court and Burger Court policies on federal habeas corpus); Miscarriageof Justice,
supra note 11, at 375-76 (same).
13. See Michael, supra note 8, at 273 (habeas corpus decisions of Burger Court exhibit
increased deference to states' judicial competency); Miscarriageof Justice, supra note 1I, at 375-76
(Burger Court decisions on habeas corpus promote federalism by relying on state courts to protect constitutional rights of citizens). In addition to promoting federalism and finality, the restrictive writ of habeas corpus advanced by the Burger Court promotes comity between state and
federal courts, furthers the intent of the framers of the Constitution, and lightens the overburdened
federal dockett. See id.
14. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
15. See id. at 87-88; see also Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court and the Congress, 44 Orio ST. L.J. 367, 384 (1983) (discussion of Sykes).
16. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963) (listing requirements for determining
when evidentiary hearing is necessary as response to habeas corpus petition); see also Comment,
Habeas Corpus: The Sixth CircuitInterprets the Cause and Prejudice Test of Wainwright v. Sykes,
48 U. CINN. L. Rav. 862, 864 n.11 (1979) [hereinafter cited as The Sixth Circuit]. The Fay "deliberate
by-pass" test, which allows a habeas corpus petition despite a petitioner's noncompliance with
a state's contemporaneous objection rule, not only increased the potential number of habeas
corpus petitioners but also required the courts to investigate petitioners' trial tactics. Id.
17. See 433 U.S. at 87 (setting forth two-part "cause and prejudice" test). The Wainwright
v. Sykes "cause and prejudice" test for permitting habeas corpus review despite petitioners' failure
to comply with state contemporaneous objection rules results from incorporating the holdings
of Davis v. United States and Francis v. Henderson. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536
(1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
In Davis, a federal prisoner petitioned the Fifth Circuit for federal habeas corpus relief alleging a faulty grand jury indictment in the district court. 411 U.S. at 235. The Fifth Circuit found
that rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure barred the petitioner's motion since
the rule requires a criminal defendant to object to defective grand jury indictments before trial.
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The cause prong of the Sykes test prohibits a defendant who has failed to

make timely objection to alleged error at trial from filing a petition for habeas
corpus review unless the defendant can demonstrate sufficient cause for noncompliance with the state's contemporaneous objection rule.' 8 To satisfy the
prejudice prong of the Sykes test, a petitioner must demonstrate actual pre-

judice resulting from the trial court errors of which the defendant complains.t 9
Subsequent to the Sykes decision, federal courts have attempted to define the
cause2" and prejudice 2l elements of the Sykes test.
In United States v. Frady'22 the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of
the prejudice prong of the Sykes test. 23 In Frady, a convicted defendant sought

federal habeas corpus relief from his murder conviction by alleging prejudicial
jury instructions at his trial in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia. 2 Although the defendant petitioner did not object to the jury

instructions at trial before the federal district court as federal procedure required, the petitioner claimed in his habeas petition that the jury instruction
concerning the meaning of malice violated due process of law. 25 The Supreme
Id.; see FED. R. CIuM. P. 12(b)(2) (petitioner must object to faulty indictment by motion prior
to trial). The Supreme Court in Davis held that a court could grant habeas corpus relief following
the petitioners' failure to object to the faulty indictment only if the prisoner demonstrated sufficient cause for failing to comply with the federal procedural rule. 411 U.S. at 242; see FED.
R. CRIN. P. 12(b)(2) (petitioner must object to faulty indictment by motion prior to trial).
In Francis,a state prisoner failed to make a timely objection to the composition of his grand
jury. 425 U.S. at 537-38. Louisiana law existing at the time of Francis required the defendant
to make objections concerning grand jury composition before the expiration of the third day
following the termination of the grand jury's term. Id. Upon habeas corpus review, the Supreme
Court held that an appellate court's power to grant collateral relief depends upon a petitioner's
demonstration of cause for failure to comply with the state's contemporaneous objection rule
and of actual prejudice resulting from failure to comply with the rule. Id. at 542.
To clarify any confusion resulting from the fact that both the Francis and Davis Court's
interpretations of the cause and prejudice elements of the Sykes test applied to grand jury proceedings, the Warren Court stated in Sykes that the "cause and prejudice" exception to the state
procedural bar rule also is applicable to cases other than those pertaining to grand jury errors.
See 433 U.S. at 87; The Sixth Circuit, supra note 16, at 865.
18. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87; see also Michael, supra note 8, at 266-67 (discussion of Sykes).
19. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87; see also Michael, supra note 8, at 266-67 (discussion of Sykes).
20. See Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 1983) (petitioner's belief that objection at trial would be futile because of unsympathetic court not sufficient cause for failure
to object); Hicks v. Scurr, 671 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1982) (failure to object to unanticipated
and incorrect statistical evidence constituted sufficient cause for failure to object).
21. See, e.g., Thompson v. White, 661 F.2d 103, 106-07 (8th Cir. 1981) (town sheriff's
choosing of entire jury constituted prejudice); Hines v Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 674 (9th Cir.
1981) (improper denial of peremptory challenge constituted prejudice); Baldwin v. Blackburn,
653 F.2d 942, 949-52 (5th Cir. 1981) (jury instruction referring to heinous nature of murder committed during perpetration of armed robbery does not constitute prejudice).
22. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
23. See id. at 168-70.
24. Id. at 157-58.
25. Id. at 158. In United States v. Frady, petitioner Frady sought federal habeas corpus
relief on the basis of prejudicial jury instructions at his district court trial. Id. at 157-58. The
judge at petitioner Frady's district court trial had instructed the jury that an intentional, wrongful
act is committed by a defendant with malice aforethought. Id. In addition, the judge instructed
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Court found that the petitioner in Frady failed to demonstrate that the alleged
improper jury instruction prejudiced the jury.26 The Frady Court held that
in order for the court to grant relief, the petitioner had to show actual prejudice and not merely the possibility of prejudice.27
28
refined the cause prong
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Engle v. Isaac
29
of the Sykes test. In Isaac, three state prisoners challenged the constitutionality
of a jury instruction requiring the prisoners to bear the burden of proof on
a claim of self-defense. 0 In dismissing the application for habeas corpus relief,
the Isaac Court held that the prisoners' lack of awareness of a constitutional
basis for challenging the jury instructions did not satisfy the cause prong of
the "cause and prejudice" test." The Isaac Court noted that the petitioner
should have objected at trial since a precedential basis for the at-trial objection to self-defense jury instructions had existed since the Supreme Court case
of In re Winship,32 which preceded the first petitioner's state trial by four
and one-half years.13 The Supreme Court in Isaac added that numerous state
court decisions challenging the constitutionality of requiring a defendant to
bear the burden of proof in a criminal trial would have permitted the peti-

the jury that the law presumes the malice essential to homicide if the defendant uses a deadly
weapon and if mitigating circumstances are absent. Id. Petitioner Frady alleged that the judge's
instructions coerced the jury into presuming malice and therefore precluded the possibility of
a manslaughter verdict. Id.
At the time of Frady's original trial, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia had jurisdiction over all local felonies. Id. at 160. Petitioner Frady violated the District
of Columbia's contemporaneous objection rule by not complying with the Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure that requires a defendant to object to erroneous jury instructions before the jury retires.
Id. at 162; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 30 (no error assignable to jury instructions unless defendant
objects before jury retires).
26. 456 U.S. at 172. The Supreme Court in Frady found overwhelming evidence of the
defendant's malice in the trial court record. Id. In addition, Frady never asserted at trial that
he acted without malice. Id. The Supreme Court held that the facts indicating malice disposed
of the contention that Frady suffered actual prejudice from the use of the questioned jury instructions. Id.
27. Id. at 170. The Frady Court concluded that the petitioner had to show that the alleged
improper jury instructions actually and substantially disadvantaged the defendant and infected
the trial with constitutional error. Id.
28. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
29. Id. at 135; see also text accompanying note 18 (explaining cause prong of Sykes test).
30. 456 U.S. at 119-23. The Ohio state courts convicted the three habeas corpus petitioners
in Engle v. Isaac at different points in time. Id. at 113-14. An Ohio grand jury convicted petitioner Hughes of voluntary manslaughter in January 1975. Id. at 113. The State of Ohio convicted petitioner Bell of murder in April 1975. Id. at 113-14. The State of Ohio convicted petitioner Isaac in September 1975 of aggravated assault. Id. at 114. The three petitioners did not
object to the impropriety of the jury instructions at their respective trials. Id. at 124-25. Ohio's
contemporaneous objection rule requiring contemporaneous objection to jury instructions barred
the petitioners from raising an unconstitutional jury instruction claim on direct appeal. Id.
31. Id. at 130-31.
32. 397 U.S. at 358 (1970).
33. See 456 U.S. at 131; infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discussion of In re
Winship).
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tioners to construct and present a valid constitutional claim at trial. 34 The
Isaac Court, however, would not decide whether the novelty of a constitu-

tional claim establishes sufficient cause for failure to object contemporaneously
to alleged impropriety at trial.3 The Supreme Court's lack of guidance forced
the federal circuits to adjudicate novelty claims without the benefit of a univer-

sal standard. 3' In Ross v. Reed,"3 the Fourth Circuit recently considered whether
the novelty of a constitutional claim satisfies the cause prong of the Sykes

"cause and prejudice" test.3

The Superior Court of Wake County, North Carolina, convicted the defen-

dant Ross in 1969 for the first degree murder of his wife. 39 At trial, Ross
presented the partial defense of lack of malice"0 and sought acquittal on a
claim of self-defense. 4 In accordance with applicable North Carolina law
existing at the time of Ross' trial, the trial judge instructed the jury that Ross
had the burden of proving both defenses. 42 Thereafter, the jury convicted Ross
34. 456 U.S. at 131-32; see, e.g., Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 827, 832-33, 218 S.E.2d
612, 616-17 (1975) (jury instructions improperly shifted burden of proof to defendant on claim
of self-defense); State v. Cuevas, 53 Haw. 110, 113, 488 P.2d 322, 325 (1971) (placing burden
of proof on defendant with regard to malice aforethought is unconstitutional); State v. Robinson, 48 Ohio App. 2d 197, 201, 356 N.E.2d 725, 730 (1975) (defendant not required to prove
self-defense claim), aff'g, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976); see also Engle v. Isaac,
456 U.S. 107, 132 n.40 (1981) (listing additional state court decisions that should have alerted
petitioners in Isaac to possibility of constitutional claim).
35. See 456 U.S. at 131. In refusing to decide whether novelty satisfies the cause prong
of the Sykes test, the Isaac court declined to adopt a rule that would require either extraordinary
foresight by counsel in objecting on currently nonexistent conditional grounds or continual objection at trial in the hope of a latent constitutional claim. Id.; see supra text accompanying
note 18 (discussion of cause prong of Sykes test). The Supreme Court in Isaac noted that discovery
of a constitutional claim that counsel could not have known about at trial does not invalidate
automatically the trial court proceedings. 456 U.S. at 131.
36. See The Sixth Circuit, supra note 16, at 866 (stating that lower federal courts were
left without guidelines for habeas corpus petitions).
37. 704 F.2d 705 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S.Ct. 523 (1983).
38. Id. at 708; see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (setting forth two-pronged
"cause and prejudice" test); supranote 35 (discussion of failure to decide novelty issue in Isaac).
39. 704 F.2d at 706. In Ross v. Reed, the defendant and his wife were living separately
at the time of the wife's murder. State v. Ross, 275 N.C. 550, 551, 169 S.E.2d 875, 876 (1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1050 (1970). Ross and his sister arrived at the home of Ross' wife to take
the children and Mrs. Ross to a shopping mall. Id. Upon return to the wife's home, defendant
Ross and his wife entered the house. Id. After a discussion concerning Ross' former girlfriend,
witnesses stated that Ross shot his wife four times. Id. at 876-77. Defendant Ross testified that
his wife had approached him with a knife and he shot his wife in self-defense. Id. at 877. Witness
testimony corroborated that Ross had a wound on his neck. Id.
40. 704 F.2d at 706. In presenting the partial defense of lack of malice, Ross attempted.
to reduce his conviction from murder to manslaughter. Id.; see United States v. Alexander, 471
F.2d 923, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 844 (1972) (manslaughter is killing without
malice); United States v. Wharton, 433 F.2d 451, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (malice is only element
that differentiates murder from manslaughter); Beardslee v. United States, 387 F.2d 280, 291
(8th Cir. 1967) (malice distinguishes murder from manslaughter).
41. 704 F.2d at 706; see supra note 39 (explaining origins of Ross' self-defense claim).
42. 704 F.2d at 706.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:491

and sentenced him to life imprisonment.4 3 The North Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed Ross' conviction in October 1969."
Soon after the North Carolina Supreme Court had affirmed Ross' conviction, however, the Burger Court revised the previously settled area of con-

stitutional law concerning the burden of proof in criminal cases. 41 In early

1970, the United States Supreme Court decided In re Winship.46 The Winship

Court held that to satisfy due process requirements, the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the offense charged.4 " Five years

after deciding In re Winship, the Supreme Court held in Mullaney v. Wilbur"
that jury instructions which shift the burden of proof to a defendant on a
heat of passion claim are unconstitutional. 49 The Supreme Court subsequently held in Hankerson v. North Carolina0 that the Mullaney holding applied
retroactively."
43. See State v. Ross, 275 N.C. 550, 551, 169 S.E.2d 875, 876 (1969).
44. 704 F.2d at 706.
45. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that prosecution must prove all
elements of charged crime); Miscarriage of Justice, supra note 11, at 385 (referring to shift in
goals between Warren Court and Burger Court on subject of habeas corpus review).
46. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). In In re Winship, the New York Family Court tried a juvenile
for stealing money from a woman's pocketbook. Id. at 360. The trial judge acknowledged that
the proof that the prosecution elicited at trial may not have proven the defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id. The judge rejected the defendant's claim that the fourteenth amendment
required the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and asserted that § 744(b)
of the New York Family Court Act required proof by the preponderance of the evidence. Id.
47. 397 U.S. at 364.
48. 421 .U.S. 684 (1972). The State of Maine found the defendant in Mullaney v. Wilbur
guilty of murder. Id. at 685; see State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139 (Me. 1971). Wilbur claimed that
he attacked the deceased as a result of the deceased's homosexual advance and sought acquittal
because of lack of intent. 421 U.S. at 685. In the alternative, Wilbur attempted to reduce a possible murder conviction to a manslaughter conviction since the homicide occurred in the heat of
passion. Id. The judge instructed the jury that a defendant must prove that he acted in the heat
of passion to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter. Id. at 686-87.
49. 421 U.S. at 703-04. The Mullaney Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in homicide cases
that heat of passion did not exist. Id. at 704.
50. 432 U.S. 233 (1977). In Hankerson v. North Carolina, the deceased asked the defendant Hankerson for a light for a cigarette while the defendant was sitting in an automobile.
Id. at 235. The defendant subsequently shot the deceased. Id. Hankerson claimed that the deceased and the deceased's friends had attacked the defendant. Id. The defendant asserted that
he acted in self-defense. Id. The trial court instructed the jury that if the state proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally killed the deceased, the law presumes malice
and the defendant then must prove that he acted in self-defense. Id. at 236. The trial court found
Hankerson guilty of second-degree murder. Id. at 238. On Hankerson's appeal, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina failed to apply the Mullaney holding retroactively because the court
foresaw the release of large numbers of murderers into society. Id. at 239-40; see supra text
accompanying notes 48-49 (discussion of Mullaney).
51. 432 U.S. 240, 244. In deciding whether the Mullaney decision would apply retroactively
the Supreme Court in Hankerson considered the potential impact of numerous habeas petitions
on the judicial system. Id. at 242-43. Foreseeing a potential flood of habeas petitions inundating
the federal courts, the Supreme Court found that states could insulate past convictions from
habeas corpus review by enforcing state contemporaneous objection rules. Id. at 244 n.8.
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Although Ross' conviction was final, Ross petitioned the North Carolina
courts for postconviction relief by relying on Mullaney and Hankerson to show
that the state court jury instruction unconstitutionally shifted the burden of
proof to Ross on the issues of lack of malice and self-defense."2 After the
North Carolina courts refused to grant Ross postconviction relief, Ross filed
a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina." The district court delayed
consideration on the petition pending the outcome of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Cole v. Stevenson." In Cole, the defendant failed to allege upon direct
appeal that a trial court jury instruction which shifted the burden of proof
on a claim of self-defense to the defendant violated due process.5 Since North
Carolina procedural rules required an immediate exception to jury instructions to preserve the claim for appellate review, the Cole court barred the
defendant from litigating a due process claim on federal habeas corpus review.5 6
After the Cole decision, the district court dismissed Ross' petition on the basis
of failure to object contemporaneously to trial court jury instructions." The
Fourth Circuit later denied Ross' petition for habeas corpus relief by relying
on the Cole court's holding that a failure to preserve a claim for appellate
review according to applicable state law bars federal habeas corpus review
of the claims. 5 8 In April of 1982, the Supreme Court granted Ross' writ of
certiorari and vacated the Fourth Circuit's judgment that had denied Ross
habeas corpus relief.5 9 Accordingly, the Supreme Court ordered the Fourth
6 2
6
6
Circuit to reconsider Ross' petition " in light of Isaac ' and Frady.
Upon re-evaluation, the Ross court examined the factual elements of the
63
case in conjunction with the restrictive Sykes "cause and prejudice" test.
52. 704 F.2d at 706.
53. Id.

54. 620 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1004 (1980).
55. Id. at 1056.
56. Id. at 1057. The Cole v. Stevenson court based its decision to deny petitioner Cole
habeas corpus review on the Hankerson finding that despite the Mullaney decision, states could
ensure the validity of past convictions by enforcing state contemporaneous objection rules. Id.
at 1056, 1061; see United States v. Hankerson, 432 U.S. 233, 244 n.8 (1977); see also supra notes
48-51 (discussion of Mullaney and Hankerson).
57. 704 F.2d at 707.
58. Id. at 706-07; see supra text accompanying notes 54-56 (discussion of Cole).
59. 704 F.2d at 706; see Ross v. Reed, 456 U.S. 921 (1981) (Supreme Court's remanding
of Ross to Fourth Circuit).
60. 704 F.2d at 707; see Ross v. Reed, 456 U.S. 921 (1981) (Supreme Court's remanding
of Ross to Fourth Circuit).
61. 456 U.S. 107 (1982); see alsosupra text accompanying notes 28-35 (discussion of Isaac).
62. 456 U.S. 152 (1982); see also supra text accompanying notes 22-27 (discussion of Frady).
63. 704 F.2d at 707; see also supra text accompanying notes 17-19 (discussion of Sykes
"cause and prejudice" test). In addition to the "cause and prejudice" argument, Ross also advanced two unsuccessfully alternative arguments in support of his habeas petition. 704 F.2d at
707. First, Ross asked the Fourth Circuit to overrule the holding in Cole v. Stevenson that failure
to comply with a state's contemporaneous objection rule barred habeas corpus review. Id.; see
Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980); see
also supra text accompanying notes 54-56 (discussion of Cole). The Ross court announced that
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The Fourth Circuit concluded that the trial court's jury instructions that shifted
the burden of proof to Ross on the issues of lack of malice and self-defense
may have encouraged the jury to render a verdict of guilty."' The Fourth Circuit reasoned that since Ross' constitutional claim that the jury instructions
violated due process of law related to the guilt determination process, Ross
suffered actual prejudice." The Ross court found therefore that Ross' claim
satisfied the prejudice prong of the Sykes test."' Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Ross had sufficient cause for failing to present his federal
claim concerning unconstitutional jury instructions to the Supreme Court of
North Carolina." In determining whether Ross' claim satisfied the cause prong
of the "cause and prejudice" test, the Ross court compared the facts of Isaac
with the facts in Ross.6" In Isaac, the first habeas corpus petitioner's trial
occurred four and one-half years after the Winship decision.69 The Isaac Court
held that the Winship holding, requiring the prosecution to prove every element of a criminal offense, provided the petitioner's attorney with precedent
sufficient to permit a valid constitutional objection to a jury instruction that
had shifted the burden of proof to a criminal defendant on the issue of
self-defense." The Supreme Court stated in Isaac that counsel's unawareness
the Fourth Circuit would follow the Cole decision unless the Fourth Circuit reversed itself in
an en banc decision or the Supreme Court specifically overruled Cole. 704 F.2d at 707. Second,
Ross claimed that the North Carolina Supreme Court waived the rule barring review of any impropriety to which the defendant failed to object at trial when the North Carolina Supreme Court
heard on direct appeal the trial judge's instructions concerning the burden of proof. Id. The
Fourth Circuit declined to rule on Ross' second argument. Id.
64. 704 F.2d at 707. The Fourth Circuit in Ross would not speculate on whether Ross'
guilty verdict resulted from the jury instruction that shifted the burden of proof or from persuasive prosecution work. Id.
65. Id.; see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1981). In Frady, the Supreme
Court stated that to demonstrate prejudice for the purposes of satisfying the Sykes test, the petitioner not only must show the erroneous nature of the jury instruction but also must show that
the instruction worked to the petitioner's actual disadvantage. 456 U.S. at 169; see supra text
accompanying notes 23-27 (discussion of Frady). In Isaac, the Supreme Court stated that the
type of constitutional claim the petitioner raised may affect the court's conclusion of the degree
of prejudice involved and that a claim concerning the truth finding function of the trial magnifies
the degree of prejudice that the appellate court is calculating. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129
(1981); see supra text accompanying notes 28-34 (discussion of Isaac).
66. 704 F.2d at 707. In Ross the prosecution conceded that the facts of the case satisfied
the prejudice prong of the Sykes test. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 18-20 (discussion
of Sykes "cause and prejudice" test).
67. 704 F.2d at 709. The Fourth Circuit apparently has joined the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in extending the Sykes test from trial defaults to appellate defaults since Ross also failed
to raise upon direct appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina the claim of unconstitutional
jury instructions in his original trial. Id. at 707; see Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 903-04
(7th Cir. 1982) (failure to object to impropriety occurring at state trial in course of direct appeal
bars litigation of issue on federal habeas corpus review); Evans v. Maggio, 557 F.2d 430, 433-34
(5th Cir. 1977) (same).
68. 704 F.2d at 707-08; see also supra text accompanying notes 28-34 (discussion of Isaac).
69. 704 F.2d at 708; see also supra text accompanying notes 28-34 (discussion of Isaac);
supra text accompanying notes 46-47 (discussion of Winship).
70. 704 F.2d at 708. See Isaac, 456 U.S. at 132 n.40 (listing other state court decisions
that should have alerted Isaac to possibility of constitutional claim).
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of an accepted constitutional development did not satisfy the cause requirement necessary for allowing habeas corpus review." In contrast to Isaac,
however, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided the Ross direct appeal
five months prior to the Winship decision." The Fourth Circuit reasoned that
although indications of a major constitutional revision concerning the burden
of proof in self-defense claims may have preceded the Winship holding, no
documented constitutional claim existed upon which Ross could have based
an objection to the jury instructions at the time of trial.73
After distinguishing Isaac to allow Ross habeas corpus review, the Fourth
Circuit supported its conclusion by discussing various policies underlying the
"cause and prejudice" test.7" In particular, the Fourth Circuit explained that
attorneys and appellate courts would have difficulty in planning trial strategy
if novelty never satisfied the cause prong of the Sykes test.7" The Ross court
reasoned that if novelty never satisfied the cause prong, attorneys would have
to argue all possible constitutional claims on appeal to ensure the right of
post-conviction relief if a favorable development in the law later arose.7 6
Moreover, the Ross court found that requiring defendants to argue all possible claims on relief would strain the overburdened federal docket with meritless
claims.77 The Ross court concluded that the Supreme Court intended the Sykes
"cause and prejudice" test to remedy situations that produce injustice.7 8 The
Fourth Circuit did not speculate whether the state court's jury instruction that
shifted the burden of proof to Ross on the issues of lack of malice and selfdefense actually affected the jurors' decision-making processes.7 9 The Ross
court stated only that shifting the burden of proof to Ross on the issues of
lack of malice and self-defense was unfair and therefore Ross' trial was a
miscarriage of justice.80 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case
to the district court and ordered the lower court to issue a writ of habeas
corpus.8 '
The Ross decision illustrates the Fourth Circuit's desire to promote fairness
and to avoid the harsh results that potentially can accompany a denial of habeas
corpus review because of a strict application of 'the Sykes test.82 Since the

71. 704 F.2d at 707.

72. Id. at 706; see also supra text accompanying notes 46-47 (discussion of Winship).
73. 704 F.2d at 708.

74. Id. at 708-09; see supra text accompanying notes 17-19 (explanation of Sykes "cause
and prejudice" test).
75. 704 F.2d at 708.
76. Id.

77. Id.
78. Id.; see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977); supra text accompanying notes
14-19 (discussion of Sykes).

79. 704 F.2d at 709.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 94-95 & n.1 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(federal courts occasionally avoid Supreme Court mandated tests and look to totality of cir-
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Supreme Court has never determined what a prisoner must demonstrate to
satisfy either the cause or prejudice prong of the test, lower federal courts
have formulated their own standards for applying the Sykes test.8 3 Federal
circuit courts are in general agreement that failure to observe state contemporaneous objection rules will bar federal habeas corpus review unless a prisoner
can show cause and prejudice in the prisoner's habeas corpus petition. 4
In addition to the Fourth Circuit, only the Ninth Circuit has recognized
that the novelty of a constitutional claim satisfies the cause prong of the Sykes
test. 5 In Myers v. Washington,86 the petitioner applied to the Washington
Supreme Court for habeas corpus relief alleging that the trial court jury instructions unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to the petitioner on
the intent element of the petitioner's murder charge. 7 Myers had failed to
cumstances to decide cases in interest of fairness); see also The Sixth Circuit, supra note 16,
874 (stating that some federal courts avoid applying Sykes strictly).
83. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 91 (1977). In Sykes, the Supreme Court
placed the burden on lower federal courts to form the precise definition of the cause and prejudice elements of the Sykes test. Id; see The Sixth Circuit, supra note 16, at 866 (federal courts
left without guidelines in defining cause or prejudice). The Supreme Court subsequently has attempted to lend courts some guidance on defining cause and prejudice but such efforts have
been nebulous. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168-69 (1982) (clarifying prejudice prong
of Sykes); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130-34 (1982) (refining cause prong of Sykes); supra
text accompanying notes 22-35 (discussion of Frady and Isaac).
84. See, e.g., Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 812-13 (1lth Cir. 1983) (procedural default
bars habeas relief unless petitioner shows cause and prejudice); Nieb v. Jago, 695 F.2d 228, 230
(6th Cir. 1982) (failure to observe contemporaneous objection rule results in procedural default
unless petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice); Sales v. Harris, 675 F.2d 532, 542 (2d Cir.)
(failure to object during state appeal creates bar to habeas review on issue unless petitioner shows
cause and prejudice), cert. denied, __
U.S.
103 S. Ct. 170 (1982); Hicks v. Scurr, 671
F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, __ U.S. , 103 S. Ct. 295 (1982); Hines v.
Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Tyler v. Phelps, 643 F.2d 1095, 1100-02
(5th Cir. 1981) (failure to observe contemporaneous objection rules bars habeas corpus relief
unless petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935 (1982).
85. See Myers v. Washington, 646 F.2d 355, 360 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 456 U.S. 921
(1982), aff'd on rehearing,702 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1983) (reaffirming original Ninth Circuit decision after Supreme Court ordered reconsideration in light of Isaac and Frady). In addition to
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, three other circuits have entertained novelty claims that the circuits
subsequently dismissed because the individual facts failed to satisfy the cause prong of the Sykes
test. See United States ex rel Hudson v. Brierton, 699 F.2d 917, 921-22 (7th Cir. 1983) (fruit
of poisonous tree doctrine not novel at time of trial); Bass v. Estelle, 696 F.2d 1154, 1157 (5th
Cir. 1983) (issue not novel since constitutional claim recognizable before trial); Dietz v. Solem,
677 F.2d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1982) (counsel had basis for constitutional claim, therefore no novelty
existed).
t
86. 646 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 456 U.S. 921 (1982), aff'd on rehearing, 702
F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1983).
87. Id. at 359. The petitioner in Myers v. Washington filed a writ of habeas corpus with
the Washington Supreme Court in 1979 on the basis of five issues he did not raise on direct
appeal of a murder conviction. Id. at 356-57. Myers' original trial occurred in 1957 and his direct
appeal occurred in 1959. Id. In a habeas corpus petition to the Washington Supreme Court,
Myers relied on the Mullaney and Hankerson holdings to challenge the original jury instructions
that shifted the burden of proof to Myers on the intent element of the murder charge. Id. at
359; see supra text accompanying notes 48-51 (discussion of Mullaney and Hankerson). The
Washington Supreme Court denied Myers' habeas corpus petition in the interest of achieving
finality of state court judgments. 646 F.2d at 357.
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raise the issue at trial or upon direct appeal.88 The Washington Superior Court
and the Washington Supreme Court decided Myers' trial and subsequent appeal several years before the Mullaney and Hankerson decisions. 89 The Ninth
Circuit granted Myers' writ of habeas corpus despite Myers' failure to raise
the constitutional due process claim on direct appeal to the Washington

Supreme Court. 9 The Myers court reasoned that the petitioner could not have
known at the time of direct appeal to the Washington Supreme Court that

the jury instructions improperly shifted the burden of proof to the petitioner. 9
The Myers court held, therefore, that the claim satisfied the cause prong of
the Sykes test. 92

The Ross and Myers holdings are correct despite the Supreme Court's
hesitancy in Isaac to certify novelty as sufficient cause to satisfy the "cause

and prejudice" test. 9 Because the Winship decision preceded the original peti-

tioner's trial in Isaac by four and one-half years, the Supreme Court did not

certify the Isaac petitioner's claims as novel. 9 In contrast, at the time of the

Ross appeal no precedent existed upon which Ross could formulate a valid
constitutional objection." Realistically, defendant's counsel could not object
at trial or on appeal when no accepted constitutional basis existed upon which
to voice an objection. 96 In keeping with the Sykes principle of avoiding miscarriages of justice, the Fourth Circuit justifiably recognized novelty of the constitutional claim as demonstrating sufficient cause to satisfy the first prong
of the Sykes test. 97
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Ross departs from the Burger Court's
goal of restricting federal habeas corpus availability to promote judicial

economy and finality. 98 The Ross court impliedly reasserts the Warren Court's

intent to protect a defendant's constitutional rights. 99 Apparently, the Fourth

Circuit recognized the harshness of its ruling in Cole which seemingly valued
88. 646 F.2d at 356-57.
89. Id.; see supra note 87 (discussion of Myers).
90. 646 F.2d at 359-60.
91. Id. at 360.
92. Id. In holding that Myers satisfied the cause prong of the Sykes test, the Myers court
concluded that the courts should not expect counsel to foresee changes in a settled area of constitutional law. Id.
93. See 704 F.2d at 709 (novelty satisfies cause prong of "cause and prejudice" test and
petitioner therefore granted habeas corpus review); Myers v. Washington, 646 F.2d 355, 360-61
(9th Cir. 1981) (same); see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 131 (1982) (Supreme Court declined
to recognize novelty as sufficient cause under "cause and prejudice" test); supra text accompanying notes 28-35 (discussion of Isaac).
94. See Isaac, 456 U.S. at 130-34; supra text accompanying notes 46-47 (discussion of
Winship).
95. See 704 F.2d at 708; supra text accompanying notes 46-47 (discussion of Winship).
96. See 704 F.2d at 708. Like the Ross decision, the Supreme Court in Isaac stated that
courts cannot expect counsel to possess extraordinary vision to anticipate new constitutional grounds
for objection. See Isaac, 456 U.S. at 131.
97. See 704 F.2d at 709; supra text accompanying notes 14-19 (discussion of Sykes).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13 (Burger Court's goal of restricting habeas
corpus availability).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8 (Warren Court's expansion of habeas corpus
availability).
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judicial economy ahead of a prisoner's constitutional rights. 0 0 Moreover, the
Ross court recognized that the vindication of a prisoner's valid constitutional
claim is of primary consideration. 10'
The Fourth Circuit effectively recognized the fallacious reasoning of the
Burger Court's promotion of judicial efficiency and finality through a restrictive writ. 10 Under the "cause and prejudice" test, a federal court's determination of whether both elements of the Sykes test exist will be subject to
appeal by either the state or the petitioner.'0 3 Prisoners who do not satisfy
the "cause and prejudice" test of Sykes will file claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel at trial. 104 If, however, a court validates a "cause and prejudice"
petition, further appeals by the petitioner or the prosecution will follow contesting any ruling on the merits. 1° ' In comparison with the Fay "deliberate
by-pass" standard, the "cause and prejudice" test is nebulous and produces
extraneous litigation.0 6

In Ross, the Fourth Circuit correctly applied the "cause and prejudice"
exception to a state procedural bar by granting the petitioner habeas corpus

relief.'0 7 Although the Ross decision contradicts the Burger Court's philosophy
by expanding the availability of the writ, the Fourth Circuit reacted appropriate-

ly to the Supreme Court's decision in Isaac not to determine whether the novelty
of a constitutional claim satisfies the cause prong of the Sykes "cause and
prejudice" test. 00 In identifying novelty as a sufficient cause under the Sykes

test, the Ross holding reflects the Fourth Circuit's willingness to protect the
100. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56 (discussion of Cole). The Fourth Circuit in
Cole decided the case based on the Hankerson determination that states could ensure the validity
of past convictions, despite the Mullaney decision, by enforcing state contemporaneous objection
rules. See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 244 n.8 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684, 704 (1972); Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055, 1057 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1004 (1981); supra notes 50-51 (discussion of Hankerson); supra notes 48-49 (discussion
of Mullaney); see also Comment, The Availability of FederalHabeas Corpus Review to State
Prisoners: The Effect of the Cause and Prejudice Test, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 532, 534-42
(1981) (discussion and analysis of Cole).
101. See 704 F.2d at 709.

102. See Miscarriageof Justice, supra note 11, at 393-94 (discussion of judicial inefficiency
of "cause and prejudice" test). The Sykes "cause and prejudice" test produces hearings on the

issues of cause and prejudice, on the merits of the substantive claim, and on whether a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 14-19 (discussion of Sykes "cause and prejudice" test).
103. See Miscarriageof Justice, supra note 11, at 394 (discussion of inefficiency of "cause
and prejudice" test).
104. Id.

105. Id.
106. Id. To clarify some of the conceptual confusion surrounding the "cause and prejudice"
test, the Supreme Court in Sykes should have stated what is necessary to satisfy the cause and
prejudice prongs of the Sykes test. Id. at 394 n.132.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 14-35 (policies and origins of "cause and prejudice"
test).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13 & 35-38 (discussion of Burger Court philosophy
and Isaac Court's inability to decide whether novelty satisfies cause prong of "cause and prejudice" test).
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constitutional rights of habeas petitioners to whom the the courts would have
denied relief because of a procedural default during state appellate review. 10 9
Until the Supreme Court specifically addresses whether novelty satisfies the
cause prong of the Sykes test, practitioners in the Fourth Circuit should be
cognizant of the Fourth Circuit's desire to rectify a miscarriage of justice on
habeas corpus review by certifying novelty as sufficient cause under the Sykes
"cause and prejudice" test.
JEFFREY

B.

J. GIGUERE

Prisoner'sRight to Change Name Under First Amendment
Free Exercise Clause

Before 1964, the United States Supreme Court refused to recognize a
prisoner's claim for alleged violations of the free exercise of religion clause
of the first amendment.' Although a prisoner does not forfeit all of his first
amendment civil rights while incarcerated, 2 a prisoner is subject to the necessary
constraints inherent in a prison environment.' A prisoner does not enjoy to
the same extent as a nonprisoner the right to exercise his religion to the limits
109. See supra text accompanying notes 63-81 (discussion of Ross court's decision to certify
novelty as sufficient cause under "cause and prejudice" test).
1. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (first amendment free exercise
clause applicable to states through fourteenth amendment); U.S. CoNsT. amend. I (Congress prohibited from establishing religion or prohibiting free exercise of religion); U.S. CoNsT amend.
XIV, § 1 (states prohibited from abridging fundamental rights of United States citizens without
due process of law); see also Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (reversing district court's
dismissal of prisoner's complaint based upon civil rights statutes for alleged violations of prisoner's
first and fourteenth amendment right to free religious expression). The Civil Rights Act of 1871
provides subject matter jurisdiction for federal courts to consider civil causes of action from
United States citizens who claim that the government has deprived them of rights, privileges,
or immunities that the Constitution protects under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196, 198 (4th
Cir. 1961) (prisoners have the right to invoke provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when alleging deprivation of certain rights and privileges of citizenship), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 421 (1973).
Compare Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871) (state once regarded prisoners as
slaves of state and in forfeiture of all civil rights) with Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp.
776, 785 (D.R.I. 1970) (courts have moved beyond Ruffin toward heightened concern for prisoners'
human rights). See generally Paulsen, Prison Reform in the Future-the Trend Toward Expansion of Prisoners' Rights, 16 VILL. L. REv. 1082 (1971).
2. See U.S. CoNsT. aniend. I; see also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (prisoners
have first amendment rights); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) (prisoners, like other
citizens, have right to petition government for redress of grievances); infra note 6 (discussion
of Johnson v. Avery).
3. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (recognizing that prisoners are subject to
appropriate prison rules and regulations).
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of the first amendment. 4 Courts generally permit prison officials to make and
enforce regulations free from judicial interference for the safe and orderly
conduct of penal institutions.5 Prison regulations, however, are subject to constitutional scrutiny by the judiciary. 6 Since 1974, the Supreme Court has sought
to enable prisoners to pursue first amendment rights freely to the extent that
the exercise of those rights is not inconsistent with the prison's interest in
security, order, or other reasonable objectives of the prison system.' Thus,
while federal courts traditionally have adopted a "hands-off"' attitude toward
problems of prison administration, federal courts have been concerned with
the constitutionality of prison regulations that interfere with a prisoner's
freedom of religion.9 The Fourth Circuit in Barrett v. Virginia'° recently considered the reasonable objectives of the penal system as weighed against a
Muslim inmate's right to change his name for religious reasons."
In Barrett, a state prisoner, Thomas Eldridge Barrett, who had converted
to Islam applied twice to the Arlington County circuit court for legal recognition of his adopted Muslim name. 12 The county court denied Barrett's requests
pursuant to a Virginia change-of-name statute' 3 that expressly prevents circuit
4. See Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). In Price v. Johnson, the Supreme
Court held that prison officials may withdraw or limit many privileges and rights of prisoners
because of the underlying interests of the penal system. Id. The Supreme Court subsequently
has identified four functions of the corrections system, including deterrence of crime by isolating
prisoners from society, protection of society by quarantining criminals, rehabilitation of offenders
so that they may become productive citizens, and preservation of internal security of the prison.
See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974).
5. See Sweet v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 863 (4th Cir. 1975)
(first amendment requires prison officials to provide only reasonable opportunities for inmates
to exercise religion); see also infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussion of Sweet).
6. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969). In invalidating a prison regulation
that prohibited inmates from giving legal advice, the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Avery held
that federal courts will protect the constitutional tights of inmates when prison regulations offePd
the fundamental guarantees of the first amendment. Id.
7. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). In Pell v. Procunier, the Supreme
Court held that courts must analyze prisoners' first amendment claims in terms of society's basic
right to protect itself from criminals. Id. at 822-23.
8. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974). The operation of correctional
facilities is the primary responsibility of the executive and legislative branches, not the judicial.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979). Furthermore, federal courts are hesitant to interfere
with state penal institutions because of limitations on the scope of federal review of the state's
police power. 416 U.S. at 404-405. See generally Note, Decency andFairnesy:An EmergingJudicial
Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REv. 841 (1971).
9. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-406 (1974) (policy of judicial restraint
does not imply unwillingness of federal courts to hear valid constitutional claims).
10. 689 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1982).
11. Id. at 501.
12. Id. at 499.
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-217 (Cum. Supp. 1983). In Virginia, it is illegal to assume a
name unlawfully. See id. § 18.2-504.1. The Virginia change-of-name statute provides the only
legal means by which a person may change his name. See id. § 8.01-217; see also 689 F.2d at
500 n.l. The statute instructs the applicant to apply to the county or city circuit court in which
the applicant resides. VA. CODE ANN.§ 8.01-217 (Cum. Supp. 1983). The statute prohibits Virginia
circuit courts from considering applications of prisoners although the statute permits the circuit
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courts from considering applications from prisoners.' 4 The prisoner brought
suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
against the Commonwealth of Virginia for alleged violations of his constitutional right under the first and fourteenth amendments to exercise his religion
freely.'" The district court referred the cause of action to a magistrate for
an evidentiary hearing 6 on the merits of Barrett's due process claim with respect
to the constitutionality of the Virginia change-of-name statute." The Commonwealth of Virginia presented evidence claiming that legal recognition of
the plaintiff's newly adopted name would lead many other prisoners to change
their names and thus unduly would burden prison administration and would
place identification records in disarray.' 8 In claiming that the Virginia changeof-name statute was unconstitutional, Barrett argued that the statute prevented
him from fully complying with the teachings of Islam 9 since Muslims consider their names to be of religious significance. 2"
At the evidentiary hearing, the magistrate held that the plaintiff's first
amendment rights outweighed the state's interest in efficient prison administration and therefore concluded that the change-of-name statute was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff.2 ' Furthermore, the magistrate found the
Virginia statute overly rigid because the statute gives the county circuit court
discretion to consider change-of-name applications from probationers who show
"good cause" but does not contain a corresponding provision for prison
inmates. "2
courts to consider "good cause" applications from probationers. Id. The statute instructs the
county circuit court to grant name changes to applicants in the absence of a fraudulent purpose.
Id. Probationers must show "good cause" in addition to the absence of a fraudulent purpose.
See id.
14. 689 F.2d at 499-500; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-217 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
15. 689 F.2d at 500. The plaintiff in Barrett v. Virginia challenged the constitutionality
of the Virginia change-of-name statute under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 689 F.2d
at 500; see supra note 1 (explaining § 1983).
16. 689 F.2d at 500. Section 636 of 28 U.S.C. provides that a federal judge may designate
a United States magistrate to conduct evidentiary hearings of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B)(1976). At the conclusion of the hearing, the
magistrate will submit to the trial court the proposed findings of fact and recommendations for
disposition. Id.
17. 689 F.2d at 500.
18. Id.; wee Joint Appendix to Briefs for Appellant and Appellee at 60-108, Barrett v. Virginia,
689 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix].
19. See Joint Appendix, supra note 18, at 32. According to Chief Minister Muhammad's
interpretation of the Muslim Holy Quran or holy book, Muslims should choose divine names. Id.
20. See id. In Barrett, the plaintiff testified at the evidentiary hearing that the Commonwealth's refusal to allow a prisoner to change his name prevented Barrett both from freeing
himself of a name that had no religious significance and from pursuing the dictates of his conscience in accordance with his firm belief that his new name was of religious significance. Id.
at 45-46. Muslims consider their birth names to be a spiritually unenlightened vestige of slave
society in which white masters gave blacks their names. See Joint Appendix, supranote 18, at 22.
21. 689 F.2d at 500.
22. See id. at 502. The magistrate in Barrettwas concerned with the lack of a "good cause"
provision for a prisoner's petition for change of name. Joint Appendix, supra note 18, at 14.
Unlike prisoners, probationers may change their names when they persuade the circuit court that
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The district court agreed with the magistrate that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Barrett and ordered the county circuit court to consider
the plaintiffs application for a change of name.23 The Commonwealth moved
to clarify the district court's order and asked permission to record Barrett's
new name as an alias.2 4 Subsequently, the district court ordered the Commonwealth to change the prison records to reflect the plaintiff's legal religious
name but allowed the defendant to list the plaintiff's given name as an alias.2'
The Commonwealth appealed the district court's ruling with respect to the
constitutionality of the Virginia change-of-name statute and the subsequent
26
order requiring the defendant to alter the plaintiff's prison records.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit in Barrett considered the constitutionality
of the Virginia change-of-name statute in light of United States Supreme Court
precedent27 and prior Fourth Circuit decisions. 28 The Barrett court cited the
29
Supreme Court's decision in Pell v. Procunier
as controlling authority in
the area of prisoners' first amendment rights." Specifically, the Fourth Circuit relied on language in Pell that an inmate forfeits only those rights that
"good cause" exists. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-217 (Cum. Supp. 1983). A religiously motivated
application for change of name presumably would constitute "good cause." See 689 F.2d at
500 (district court ordered county circuit court to consider Barrett's application for change of name).
23. 689 F.2d at 500.
24. Id. The Commonwealth in Barrett argued in favor of keeping a prisoner's name the
same from the time of arrest until the date of release from the prison facility. Joint Appendix,
supra note 18, at 66-67. In addition to prisons, other facilities such as hospitals and dental clinics,
as well as the F.B.I. and the National Criminal Records Exchange, use a prisoner's name of
record. Id. at 61-68. The Commonwealth argued that changing a prisoner's name of record would
cause the state undue burdens. 689 F.2d at 500.
25. 689 F.2d at 500. Prison officials apparently identify prisoners by many different names
throughout incarceration, and consequently the prison adds aliases as "a/k/a's" following a
prisoner's name of record. See id. (district court required defendant to change all prison records
of plaintiff to reflect religious name as Barrett's name of record).
26. 689 F.2d at 499.
27. See id. at 501-503. In considering the constitutionality of the Virginia change-of-name
statute, the Fourth Circuit in Barrett relied on four Supreme Court cases to determine the applicable standard for judging prisoner first amendment claims. Id. at 501; see Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); see also infra
notes 30 & 37 and accompanying text (discussion of Pell and Jones).
28. See 689 F.2d at 501-503. The Fourth Circuit in Barrettrelied on three precedents within
the circuit to determine whether the prisoner's claimed first amendment interests should override
the limitations on prisoners' free exercise rights that the Virginia change-of-name statute imposes.
Id.; see Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 670 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1982) (upholding Cherokee Indian prisoner's
first amendment religious right to have long hair);'Pittman v. Hutto, 594 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.
1979) (upholding censorship of prison magazine); Sweet v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections,
529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975) (upholding denial of prisoner's request to attend regular chapel
service with general prison population); see also infra notes 57, 67 & 81 and accompanying text
(discussion of Sweet, Gallahan, Pittman).
29. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
30. 689 F.2d at 501; see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (analyzing prisoner
first amendment claims in terms of legitimate policies and goals of corrections system). The Pell
Court considered the proper scope of journalists' access to prison inmates. Id. at 821-22. The
Supreme Court in Pell held that the prison's refusal to allow the press access to specific inmates
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conflict with his status as a prisoner or with the state's interest in deterrence
of crime, protection of society from criminals, rehabilitation of prisoners, and
the maintenance of internal prison security.3 ' In interpreting this language from
Pell, the Fourth Circuit admitted that restrictions on a prisoner's freedom
are not unconstitutional when such restrictions are necessary to preserve the
legitimate interests of penal institutions. 32 The Barrett court recognized that
the judiciary ordinarily accords substantial deference to determinations by correctional officials in enforcing prison discipline and order.33 The Fourth Circuit reasoned, however, that the Commonwealth's determination of the34constitutionality of prison strictures is not immune from judicial review.
In evaluating the constitutionality of the Virginia change-of-name statute,
the Barrettcourt analyzed the reasonableness of the fears of prison officials
concerning prison discipline and order. 3 During oral argument before the Barrett court, the Commonwealth relied principally on Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners'Labor Union36 in which the United States Supreme Court held that
courts must defer to the informed discretion of penal officials regarding the
reasonableness of restrictions on inmate freedom unless the prison officials
clearly exaggerate the seriousness of threats to prison order and security.3 7
The Barrett court, however, determined that the Commonwealth's analysis
of Jones was overly broad, and thus the Fourth Circuit concluded that Jones
did not prohibit judicial review of restrictions on prisoners' first amendment
freedoms. 8 In explaining the willingness of the judiciary to hear valid first
amendment claims, the Barrett court cited language in Jones to the effect that
prison regulations may restrain prisoners' civil liberties only to the extent that
is necessary to prevent serious risks to prison security. 39 In Jones, the Supreme
Court upheld the refusal of prison officials to allow the activities of a prisoners'
union by reasoning that the threat of an organized prisoner union warranted
the restrictions on the first amendment freedom to associate.4" Although
recognizing a prison's interest in maintaining order and security, the Barrett
court concluded that the Supreme Court in Jones did, not abdicate the
did not infringe unconstitutionally upon the prisoners' right of free speech since the prisoners

could receive other visitors. Id. at 821, 825.
31. 417 U.S. at 822-23, quoted in 689 F.2d at 501.
32. 689 F.2d at 501.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id. at 502-503.
36. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
37. 689 F.2d at 501; see Jones, 433 U.S. at 128-30 (upholding prison ban on inmate union).

In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, the Supreme Court emphasized the difficulties of running a penal institution and asserted the judiciary's wide-ranging deference for
the decisions of prison officials because courts are ill-equipped to deal with the urgent problems
of prison administration. Id. at 126.
38. 689 F.2d at 502.
39. Id.; see Jones, 433 U.S. at 133 (upholding constitutionality of prison regulation since

prison drafted regulation no more restrictively than necessary to counter perceived threat to prison
security).
40. 433 U.S. at 133.
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judiciary's constitutional authority to protect the individual liberties of
prisoners. 4' Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court and
held the Virginia change-of-name statute unconstitutional. 42 Furthermore, the
Barrettcourt reiterated the lower court's view that the statute's lack of a "good
cause" exception for prisoners as well as for probationers was fatal to the
statute's constitutionality.43 To the extent that the Virginia change-of-name
statute infringed upon the plaintiff's first amendment religious expression, the
Fourth Circuit considered the absence of a good cause exception to be
unreasonable and thus unconstitutional. 44 Implicit in the balancing approach
in Jones, according to the Barrett court, is the recognition that restrictions
on prisoners' first amendment rights must be no broader than necessary to
protect the prison's interests in order and security.45 The Fourth Circuit agreed
with the district court that the plaintiff's rights to practice his religion required
the circuit court to consider Barrett's good cause application for a change
of name.4'The Fourth Circuit held, therefore, that the change-of-name statute
unreasonably restricted the plaintiff's first amendment religious expression
because permitting prisoners to change their names on religious grounds would
present no undue hardship to prison administration. 7
Although the Barrett court declared the Virginia change-of-name statute
unconstitutional, the Fourth Circuit found error in the district court's subsequent order requiring the Commonwealth to reorganize its files to reflect a
prisoner's current legal name. ' The Fourth Circuit preferred instead to conform to the general principle that the first amendment only prohibits government action and does not require affirmative acts. 49 By preserving the latitude
41. 689 F.2d at 502.
42. Id. at 503.
43. Id.; see Joint Appendix, supra note 18, at 25. The Barrettcourt agreed with the district

court that the Virginia change-of-name statute was overly rigid in not allowing even the consideration of a request from a prisoner for a change of name. 689 F.2d at 502. In declaring
the Virginia statute unconstitutional, the Fourth Circuit characterized its decision as consistent
with the principle that prisons should choose the least restrictive alternative available when encroaching upon prisoners' first amendment freedoms. Id.
44. 689 F.2d at 503.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 502.
Id.
Id. at 503.
Id.
Id.; see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 878-79 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,

concurring) (first amendment freedom of speech does not require government to provide public
school students with specific books in school library although state may not remove specific books
from library for purpose of restricting access to ideas that school officials find offensive); Smith
v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979) (state highway commission's
procedure to accept grievances only from employees directly and not from union on behalf of
employees does not violate freedom of association rights of union members since first amendment does not impose on government affirmative obligation to recognize union); Silvette v. Art
Comm'n of Va., 413 F. Supp. 1342, 1346 (E.D. Va. 1976) (notwithstanding artist's right to free
artistic expression, artist does not have first amendment right to compel government to display
his paintings); U.S. CoNsT. amend. I (prohibiting government actions infringing fundamental
rights);'seealso infra note 51 (analyzing Brzett court's discussion of general rule that first amendment does not require affirmative government acts).
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of prison officials with regard to prison records, the Fourth Circuit emphasized
that courts must defer to prison officials whenever administrative decisions
do not implicate constitutional rights.50 In the Barrett court's view, the free
exercise clause of the first amendment requires only that the Commonwealth
comply with the plaintiff's request for a religiously motivated change of name.'
Prior to the Barrett decision, the leading case in the Fourth Circuit on
first amendment religious issues pertaining to inmates was Sweet v. South
CarolinaDepartment of Corrections.2 In Sweet, the Fourth Circuit upheld
a prison's decision denying a prisoner the right to attend chapel services along
with the general prison population. 5 3 The prisoner's reputation among other
prisoners as an informer in connection with a riot prompted the prisoner in
Sweet to request segregated confinement for his own safety. 4 The Sweet court
refused to disturb the reasonable judgment of prison officials that the prison
could not guarantee an inmate's safety at prison-wide chapel services. 5 The
Barrett court cited with approval language from Sweet that prison regulations
unconstitutionally infringe upon first amendment freedoms only when prison
officials are unable to justify the regulation in the interests of discipline and
50. 689 F.2d at 503.

51. Id. In reversing the district court's order directing the Commonwealth to record the
plaintiff's legal name as the name of record, the Barrett court cited several precedents which
indicated that the free exercise clause of the first amendment does not require a prison to alter
prison files. See, e.g., Akbar v. Canney, 634 F.2d 339, 340 (6th Cir. 1980) (inmate does not
have constitutional right to dictate how prison keeps records), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1002 (1981);
Smalley v. Bell, 484 F. Supp. 16, 17 (W.D. Okla. 1979) (changing all records of prisoner to
reflect new name is insurmountable task); Muhammad v. Keve, 479 F. Supp. 1311, 1324 (D.
Del. 1979) (state may identify citizens by any name, number, or symbol state chooses even though
means of identification is personally offensive to person identified); United States v. Duke, 458
F. Supp. 1188, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (alteration of records creates confusion and substantial
record-keeping problems).
52. 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975). Since 1961, the Fourth Circuit has recognized causes of
action by prisoners seeking injunctive relief and damages against prison officials for alleged denials
of religious freedom. See Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1961) (prisoners do
not relinquish all civil rights). In Sewell v. Pegelow, the Fourth Circuit ignored criticism that,
by granting a hearing to a prisoner who accused prison officials of placing him in solitary confinement because of his religion, similar petitions would inundate federal courts in the future.
Id. The Sewell court held that a prisoner's basic constitutional rights far outweighed the prison's
interest in administrative efficiency. Id. The Fourth Circuit has placed first amendment religious
freedom in a "preferred" position among other first amendment rights. See Brown v. Peyton,
437 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th Cir. 1971Y (criminals and prison communities may benefit from
rehabilitative effects of religious devotion). In Brown v. Peyton, the Fourth Circuit noted that
judges, not prison officials, must secure constitutional freedoms of prisoners. Id. at 1232. Thus,
the Fourth Circuit from the early 1960's to the present has been at the forefront of a trend
throughout the federal appellate circuits toward the increased recognition of prisoners' first amendment rights. See generally Flaherty, Inside the Invisible Courts, N.L.J., May 2, 1983, 1; Note,
The Religious Rights of the Incarcerated, 125 U. PA. L. Rav. 812 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Religious Rights].
53. 529 F.2d at 864.
54. Id. at 857.
55. Id. at 863. Prison officials in Sweet v. South CarolinaDep't of Corrections offered
individual religious ministration to prisoners in segregated confinement in lieu of attendance at
regular prison services. Id. at 864.
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order. 6 To determine the reasonableness of prison regulations, the Sweet court
balanced the legitimate civil rights of prisoners against the concern of prison
authorities for security and order and concluded that the prison's denial of
the inmate's request to attend prison-wide chapel services was permissible under
the first amendment.5
In addition to the Fourth Circuit, several United States circuit courts of
appeals have considered the first amendment rights of prisoners in light of
the responsibilities of prison officials in maintaining security and order.5 8 The
Second Circuit's decision in LaReau v. MacDougall" is consistent with the
Supreme Court's decision in Procunier v. Martinez.6" In attempting to formulate a standard of review for prisoner first amendment claims, the Martinez Court established a two-part test to invalidate a prison regulation authorizing mail censorship.6" The Martinez Court explained that a prison regulation
must advance an important government interest and must be no broader than
62
necessary to protect prison order, security, and the rehabilitation of inmates.
In MacDougall, the Second Circuit emphasized that restraints on religious
liberty are unconstitutional if less restrictive alternatives are available.6 3 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Teterud v. Burns" invalidated a prison regulation
that required an Indian prisoner to cut his hair, which the prisoner wore long
for religious reasons, since the prison could pursue other alternatives without
threatening prison security. 65 On essentially the same facts as in Teterud, the
56. 689 F.2d at 503; see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) (federal courts must
evaluate validity of prison regulations according to whether officials have overemphasized security
to detriment of prisoners' fundamental liberties); Sweet, 529 F.2d at 860 (balancing of competing
interests of prisoners and prison authorities is inevitable).
57. 529 F.2d at 864. The Sweet court held that a prisoner may exercise first amendment
rights free from prison interference subject to the reasonable requirements of prison discipline
and security. Id. at 859. The Fourth Circuit in Barrett merely interpreted the reasonableness of
prison regulations in light of Jones v. North CarolinaPrisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119
(1977), which the Supreme Court decided after the Fourth Circuit's decision in Sweet, and held
that Jones was consistent with the principle of judicial review of the reasonableness of prison
regulations. See 689 F.2d at 502. Relying on both Jones and Sweet as precedent, the Barrett
court decided that the Virginia change-of-name statute was invalid because the statute unreasonably
restricted the plaintiff's religious expression by not allowing Barrett to change his name. See
id. at 502-503.
58. See ReligiousRights, supra note 52, at 839-51 (discussing federal appellate courts' disposition of prisoner first amendment claims).
59. 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
60. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
61. See id. at 412-13; MacDougall, 473 F.2d at 979 (applying a balancing test to determine
whether prison regulation infringes upon free exercise clause). In LaReau v. MacDougall, the
Second Circuit considered whether a prison regulation denying unruly prisoners access to Sunday
nmass furthered an important prison objective and whether the restraint on religious liberty reasonably
achieved the objective. Id. The MacDougallcourt upheld the trial court's dismissal of the prisoner's
complaint and noted the substantial interest of prison officials in preventing a major incident
between the unruly prisoners and the general inmate population. Id.
62. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413.
63. MacDougall, 473 F.2d at 979.
64. 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
65. Id. at 362. In invalidating a prison regulation requiring a prisoner to cut his hair, the
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Fourth Circuit in Gallahan v. Hollyfield", similarly held that a prison haircut
regulation as applied to an Indian inmate was unconstitutional because the
prison could preserve order and discipline without forcing the plaintiff to cut
his hair.67
Not all federal circuit courts, however, have required prisons to utilize
less restrictive alternatives when a prisoner's first amendment freedoms are
at stake.68 For example, the Third Circuit in St. Claire v. Cuyler"4 held that
the Martinez Court's least restrictive means test concerning the reasonableness
of prison regulations no longer was valid after Jones. 0 In determining that
Jones invalidated the Martinez least restrictive means test, the Third Circuit
cited language from Jones to the effect that a prison regulation protecting
order and discipline is constitutional unless the prisoner can prove convincingly that prison officials have exaggerated their response to security threats.'
Eighth Circuit in Teterud v. Burns cited evidence that Indians consider their bodies as gifts from
nature and thus sacred. Id. at 360 nn.5-6. The first amendment, according to the Eighth Circuit,
protects an Indian's desire to wear his hair uncut for religious reasons. Id. at 360 & n.5. The
Teterud court suggested that instead of requiring a prisoner to cut his hair, the prison could
require the inmate to keep his hair clean, to submit to searches of his hair for contraband, to
wear a hair net when preparing food, and to sit for a new identification photograph. Id. at 361.
The prison officials in Teterud could not justify their regulation as constituting the least restrictive means of preserving the interests of prison administration when the prisoner's first amendment right was at stake. Id. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit found the regulation invalid. Id.
66. 670 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1982).
67. See id. at 1346-47 (least restrictive means test). The prison in Gallahan v. Hollyfield
argued that inmates with long hair are harder to identify than prisoners with short hair because
long hair will enable prisoners to conceal their features. Id. at 1346. Furthermore, the prison
noted that long hair is not only unsanitary but also provides a hiding place for contraband. Id.
Notwithstanding the prison's arguments for restricting the length of prisoners' hair, the Gallahan
court recognized other alternatives to requiring short hair in order to protect the prison's legitimate
interests. Id. For example, the court commented that rather than cutting an inmate's hair, prisons
could require an inmate to keep his hair tied back in a ponytail. Id. at 1347.
68. See St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1980) (extreme deference to decisions of prison officials).
69. Id at 109.
70. Id. at 114. In St. Claire v. Cuyler, the Third Circuit upheld a prison regulation that
prevented Muslim prisoners from wearing religious head coverings. Id. at 112-15. The Cuyler
court argued that Supreme Court pronouncements of the least restrictive means standard should
not control over the wide-ranging deference that courts must accord prison officials. Id. at 114.
The Jones Court specifically mentioned that prison officials must draft regulations no more broadly
than necessary to preserve prison security. 433 U.S. at 133. While the Third Circuit seems to
have overlooked this language from Jones, the Third Circuit did recognize that judicial deference
toward prison officials might not be applicable in situations in which prison officials could not
justify their actions with regard to institutional security. 634 F.2d at 114. Cuyler perhaps is
distinguishable from the Fourth Circuit's holding in Barrettto the extent that less restrictive alternatives were not feasible in the Cuyler case. Id. at 115. In Cuyler, the prison produced convincing
evidence that the facility simply did not have the resources and guards available to search each
inmate who wore headgear for contraband. Id. Moreover, a prison official in Cuyler testified
that prisoners used hats for purposes other than religious expression. Id. Gangs within the prison
apparently identified themselves by wearing certain types of head coverings. Id. The Third Circuit, therefore, probably could have reached the same result in upholding the prison regulation
under a least restrictive means analysis. Id.
71. 634 F.2d at 114. The Cuyler court's reluctance to second-guess the decisions of prison
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In interpreting the reasonableness of prison regulations, other federal circuit courts in addition to the Barrettcourt have balanced the prison's interests
in order and security against the first amendment rights of prisoners. The
outcome, however, depends largely on how much deference courts are willing
to accord prison officials."' The Tenth Circuit in Kennedy v. Meachum 74 required prison officials to justify a prison regulation by a compelling state interest which is the same standard courts use in determining the validity of
76
first amendment free exercise claims of nonprisoners."1 In Madyun v. Franzen,

the Seventh Circuit attempted to find a middle ground between the
reasonableness standard in Jones and the compelling state interest standard."'

Consequently, the Madyun court cited with approval the Second Circuit's deciofficials is consistent with the view that courts will avoid interfering with prisons in matters of
internal security. Id.; see Phillips v. Bureau of Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (threats
to institutional security endanger order and safety of prisons and thus courts should defer to
informed discretion of prison officials).
72. See, e.g., Green v. White, 545 F.2d 1099, 1100 (8th Cir. 1976) (prisoner not allowed
special privileges in name of religion); O'Brien v. Blackwell, 421 F.2d 844, 845 (5th Cir. 1970)
(extreme deference for prison officials); Brown v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1376, 1377 (5th Cir.
1970) (prison regulations must not be arbitrary). See generally Religious Rights, supra note 52,
at 839-51 (at least seven different standards exist for analyzing prisoner free exercise claims).
73. See Religious Rights, supra note 52, at 863-65 (courts defer to prison officials when
absence of challenged regulation would threaten compelling interests such as security and order).
Courts seldom find administrative economy and convenience compelling reasons for restricting
prisoners' first amendment rights. Id. at 865.
74. 540 F.2d 1057 (10th Cir. 1976).
75. Id. at 1061. In determining the constitutionality of nonprisoner first amendment claims,
the Supreme Court has required the government to show that compelling state interests justify
the burdens placed on a person's first amendment rights. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (state interest in mandatory school attendance not so compelling to overcome religious practices of Amish); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-406 (1963) (establishing
balancing test in which court weighs state interests against deprivation of first amendment rights).
76. 704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1983).
77. Id. at 959. In Madyun v. Franzen, the Seventh Circuit considered the first amendment
right of a male prisoner to refuse to submit to a "frisk search" by a female prison guard. Id.
at 955. The plaintiff in Madyun claimed that his Islamic faith forbade physical contact with a
woman other than his wife or mother and that to force the plaintiff to submit to a frisk search
under such circumstances constituted a violation of the plaintiff's first amendment rights. Id.
In upholding the constitutionality under the first amendment of a frisk search of the prisoner
by a female prison guard, the Tenth Circuit rejected both the compelling state interest and the
reasonableness standards of review of first amendment claims. Id. at 958; see supra text accompanying note 36 & note 75 and accompanying text (explaining reasonableness and compelling
state interest standards). The reasonableness standard requires a prison to show that a prison
regulation does not unreasonably restrict a prisoner's first amendment rights while the compelling state interest standard requires the state to provide a compelling justification for interfering
with the first amendment rights of citizens. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977) (reasonableness standard); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)
(compelling state interest standard). The Madyun court held that a compelling state interest test
was applicable only in nonprisoner first amendment actions. 704 F.2d at 958. The Tenth Circuit
also considered the reasonableness standard to be inappropriate since such a broad standard would
force courts to defer almost completely to prison officials in matters of prison administration.
Id. at 959. In Madyun, the Tenth Circuit adopted instead the Second Circuit's least restrictive
alternative standard in LaReau v. MacDougalland held that the state had an important objective
in providing equal opportunity for women to serve as prison guards and that frisk searches of
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sion in MacDougallapplying the least restrictive alternative test and held that
a prison had an important interest in allowing a female prison guard to search
a male inmate notwithstanding a tenet of the prisoner's religion that forbade
physical contact with a woman other than the prisoner's wife or mother. 78
No matter what standard courts use in determining the constitutionality
of restrictions of prisoners' first amendment rights, courts generally are in
agreement that mere administrative inconvenience rarely, if ever, outweighs
the prisoner's interest in freedom of religious expression. 9 The Fourth Circuit in Barrett correctly refused to uphold the constitutionality of Virginia's
change-of-name statute when convenience of record-keeping was the only
justification that the Commonwealth could offer in support of the statute's
validity.8" Name changes should weigh less heavily with courts than, for
example, control of inflammatory publications, 8 ' prison-wide unions," and
potential riots 83 since administrative inconvenience does not endanger prison
male prisoners reasonably allowed the state fully to utilize female prison guards. Id. at 960; see
LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir. 1972); supra note 61 (discussion of MacDougall). The Fourth Circuit in Barrett recognized that an overly broad interpretation of the
reasonableness standard in Jones inevitably would lead courts to defer to the judgment of prison
officials irrespective of the legitimate first amendment claims of prisoners. See 689 F.2d at 502;
see also Jones, 433 U.S. at 127-28. Nevertheless, the Barrett court adopted the reasonableness
standard but rejected the Commonwealth of Virginia's contention that courts should defer to
the reasonable judgment of prison officials. 689 F.2d at 502. The Barrett court held that courts
and not prison officials ultimately must determine the reasonableness of prison regulations that
infringe upon first amendment rights of prisoners. Id.; see text accompanying note 38 (judicial
review of prison restrictions still valid after Jones).
78. Madyun, 704 F.2d at 960; see LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir. 1972).
79. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 267 (1974) (administrative
convenience is not compelling state interest); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,
646-47 (1974) (Bill of Rights protects citizens against government's inevitable concern for administrative efficiency); Muhammad v. Keve, 479 F. Supp. 1311, 1323 n.15 (D. Del. 1979) (administrative convenience does not rise to level of legitimate interest of prison in security and
order). In Muhammad v. Keve, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware held that
the failure of state prison officials to recognize plaintiffs' Muslim names in the interests of administrative efficiency did not outweigh the prisoners' interests in free expression of their religion.
Id. at 1322.
80. Barrett, 689 F.2d at 500.
81. Pittman v. Hutto, 594 F.2d 407, 410 (4th Cir. 1979). In Pittman v. Hutto, the Fourth
Circuit cited language from Jones that courts must defer to the reasonable decisions of prison
officials. Id. at 412; see Jones, 433 U.S. at 129-32. The Pittman court upheld the prison's censorship of a prisoner magazine because of inflammatory articles and reasoned that language in Martinez that prison regulations must be no broader than necessary to achieve penal objectives was
inapplicable in cases in which the possibility of disruptions of prison security justified the prison
stricture. Id. at 411; Comment, Prisonsand the First Amendment, 66 VA. L. REV. 232, 232-33
(1980) (in view of seriousness of threat to prison security, Pittman arguably was correct in citing
Jones as controlling authority).
82. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977); see supra
text accompanying notes 36-41 (discussion of Jones).
83. Jones, 433 U.S. at 132-33. Prison officials in Jones were concerned with violence,
especially full-scale riots. Id. Indeed, in the wake of the Attica prison riot in September, 1971,
a crisis mentality has pervaded the outlook of courts toward the problems of prisons. See id.
at 133 (courts must allow prison officials to act before "eve of a riot"); Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 404-405 (1974) (judicial deference toward prison officials reflects no more than

